Reference

Windows event ID guide

The event log entries that matter most in an investigation, grouped by question. For each one: what it records, the fields to read first, which events to correlate it with, and the audit settings or conditions under which it will not appear.

  • 53event IDs
  • 10topics
  • 12logon types
  • 6log channels

Showing all 53 events.

Logon types (4624, 4625)

The LogonType field tells you how a session was created. Read it before drawing any conclusion from a logon event.

TypeNameMeaning
0SystemUsed only by the System account, for example at system startup.
2InteractiveA user logged on at this computer, for example at the console keyboard.
3NetworkA user or computer logged on to this computer from the network, for example to access a shared folder.
4BatchUsed by batch servers, where processes run on behalf of a user without direct intervention, such as scheduled tasks.
5ServiceThe Service Control Manager started a service under this account.
7UnlockThe workstation was unlocked.
8NetworkCleartextNetwork logon in which the password was passed to the authentication package in unhashed form. This does not by itself mean the password crossed the network in cleartext.
9NewCredentialsA caller cloned its token and specified new credentials for outbound connections; the local identity stays the same (for example runas /netonly).
10RemoteInteractiveA user logged on remotely using Terminal Services or Remote Desktop.
11CachedInteractiveLogon with network credentials stored locally; the domain controller was not contacted to verify them.
12CachedRemoteInteractiveDocumented as the same as RemoteInteractive and used for internal auditing.
13CachedUnlockUnlock using cached credentials; Microsoft's table describes it only as "Workstation logon".

Logon and session 8

4624

An account was successfully logged on

Security

Generated on the computer that was accessed when a logon session is created. Records who logged on, the logon type, the authentication package and, for network logons, the source workstation and address.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Read LogonType first, then pair TargetLogonId with 4634/4647 to bound the session and with 4672 to see privileged logons. For remote access, compare IpAddress and WorkstationName with 4778/4779 and RDP events 21/24/25.

Caveats

Requires Audit Logon. Logon IDs are unique only until the next reboot. IpAddress may be empty or loopback for local logons, and a logon session does not prove that a particular person was at the keyboard.

Fields

SubjectUserName · SubjectLogonId · TargetUserSid · TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetLogonId · LogonType · LogonProcessName · AuthenticationPackageName · WorkstationName · LogonGuid · ProcessName · IpAddress · IpPort · RestrictedAdminMode · TargetLinkedLogonId · ElevatedToken

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4624(S) An account was successfully logged on · checked 2026-10-14

4625

An account failed to log on

Security

Logged for any logon failure on the computer where the attempt was made. Status and SubStatus carry NTSTATUS codes that give the reason, such as a bad password or a disabled account.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Group by TargetUserName, IpAddress and SubStatus over time to separate password guessing, account enumeration (0xC0000064) and misconfigured services. Look for a 4624 for the same account and source after a run of failures.

Caveats

Requires Audit Logon or Audit Account Lockout. In domains, the authoritative record of the credential check may be on the domain controller (4771, 4776) rather than on the target host.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · Status · FailureReason · SubStatus · LogonType · LogonProcessName · AuthenticationPackageName · WorkstationName · ProcessName · IpAddress · IpPort

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4625(F) An account failed to log on · checked 2026-10-14

4634

An account was logged off

Security

Generated when a logon session is terminated and no longer exists.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Match TargetLogonId to the 4624 that opened the session to estimate its duration. For interactive and remote interactive sessions, expect it together with 4647.

Caveats

Requires Audit Logoff. Short network sessions may close long after use or not be logged when the system loses power, so a missing 4634 is not proof that a session stayed open.

Fields

TargetUserSid · TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetLogonId · LogonType

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4634(S) An account was logged off · checked 2026-10-14

4647

User initiated logoff

Security

Generated when an account starts a logoff through the logoff function. It is most typical for interactive and remote interactive logons.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Use it to distinguish a deliberate sign-out from a session that simply ended (4634 only). Correlate TargetLogonId with 4624.

Caveats

Requires Audit Logoff. Not generated when a session ends through disconnection, shutdown or power loss.

Fields

TargetUserSid · TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetLogonId

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4647(S) User initiated logoff · checked 2026-10-14

4648

A logon was attempted using explicit credentials

Security

Generated when a process attempts a logon by explicitly specifying an account's credentials, for example with RUNAS or in batch configurations such as scheduled tasks.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Shows which logged-on account used which other account's credentials, from which process and towards which server. Correlate ProcessId with 4688 and SubjectLogonId with 4624; it is a key source for lateral-movement analysis on the originating host.

Caveats

Requires Audit Logon. It is also a routine event during normal operating system activity, so volume alone is not suspicious.

Fields

SubjectUserName · SubjectLogonId · LogonGuid · TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetServerName · TargetInfo · ProcessId · ProcessName · IpAddress · IpPort

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4648(S) A logon was attempted using explicit credentials · checked 2026-10-14

4672

Special privileges assigned to new logon

Security

Generated when a new logon session receives sensitive privileges such as SeDebugPrivilege, SeBackupPrivilege or SeTcbPrivilege. Every SYSTEM logon also triggers it.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Join SubjectLogonId to the 4624 recorded at the same moment to identify administrative-equivalent logons. Focus on accounts other than SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE and NETWORK SERVICE.

Caveats

Recorded only when the "Audit Special Logon" audit subcategory is enabled. Retention depends on log size and overwrite settings.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · PrivilegeList

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4672(S) Special privileges assigned to new logon · checked 2026-10-14

4778

A session was reconnected to a Window Station

Security

Generated when a user reconnects to an existing Terminal Services session, switches to an existing desktop with Fast User Switching, or reconnects to a Hyper-V Enhanced Session.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

ClientName and ClientAddress record the connecting client; SessionName shows the channel (RDP-Tcp#N, Console). Pair with 4779 to build connect and disconnect intervals.

Caveats

Requires Audit Other Logon/Logoff Events. A new RDP logon (as opposed to a reconnection) is recorded by 4624 with LogonType 10, not by this event.

Fields

AccountName · AccountDomain · LogonID · SessionName · ClientName · ClientAddress

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4778(S) A session was reconnected to a Window Station · checked 2026-10-14

4779

A session was disconnected from a Window Station

Security

Generated when a user disconnects from a Terminal Services session, switches away with Fast User Switching, or disconnects from a Hyper-V Enhanced Session.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Pair with 4778 and 4624 (LogonType 10) to reconstruct remote session intervals; compare ClientAddress with known internal ranges.

Caveats

Requires Audit Other Logon/Logoff Events. A disconnection leaves the session running; it is not a logoff.

Fields

AccountName · AccountDomain · LogonID · SessionName · ClientName · ClientAddress

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4779(S) A session was disconnected from a Window Station · checked 2026-10-14

Account management 11

4720

A user account was created

Security

Generated every time a new user object is created, on domain controllers, member servers and workstations. Subject fields identify who created it; the remaining fields record the new account's initial attributes.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Establish who created the account (SubjectLogonId → 4624) and whether it was immediately enabled, added to privileged groups (4728, 4732, 4756) or used to log on.

Caveats

Recorded only when the "Audit User Account Management" audit subcategory is enabled. Retention depends on log size and overwrite settings.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · SamAccountName · UserPrincipalName · PasswordLastSet · AccountExpires · PrimaryGroupId · AllowedToDelegateTo · NewUacValue · UserAccountControl · SidHistory

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4720(S) A user account was created · checked 2026-10-14

4722

A user account was enabled

Security

Generated each time a user or computer object is enabled. For computer accounts it appears only on domain controllers.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Check whether a dormant or disabled account was re-enabled shortly before it was used; correlate with 4720, 4738 and subsequent 4624 events for the same SID.

Caveats

Recorded only when the "Audit User Account Management" audit subcategory is enabled. Retention depends on log size and overwrite settings.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4722(S) A user account was enabled · checked 2026-10-14

4723

An attempt was made to change an account's password

Security

Generated when a user attempts to change his or her own password. A failure is logged when the new password does not meet policy (and, for local accounts, when the old password is wrong).

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Subject and target are normally the same account. Distinguish from 4724, where one account resets another's password.

Caveats

Requires Audit User Account Management. For domain accounts, a wrong old password is recorded on the domain controller as 4771 or 4776 rather than as a 4723 failure.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · PrivilegeList

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4723(S, F) An attempt was made to change an account's password · checked 2026-10-14

4724

An attempt was made to reset an account's password

Security

Generated each time an account attempts to reset another account's password, including computer account resets.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Identify who reset whose password and whether the target account logged on from a new source afterwards. Resets on high-value or service accounts deserve review.

Caveats

Requires Audit User Account Management. No failure event is generated when the attempt is refused with Access Denied.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4724(S, F) An attempt was made to reset an account's password · checked 2026-10-14

4725

A user account was disabled

Security

Generated every time a user or computer object is disabled. For computer accounts it appears only on domain controllers.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Useful for showing when access was withdrawn, or when an attacker disabled accounts to disrupt response. Compare the time with later 4624/4625 for the same SID.

Caveats

Recorded only when the "Audit User Account Management" audit subcategory is enabled. Retention depends on log size and overwrite settings.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4725(S) A user account was disabled · checked 2026-10-14

4726

A user account was deleted

Security

Generated every time a user object is deleted, on domain controllers, member servers and workstations.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

TargetSid identifies the deleted account reliably because SIDs are not reused; use it to find the account's earlier activity in other logs and artifacts.

Caveats

Recorded only when the "Audit User Account Management" audit subcategory is enabled. Retention depends on log size and overwrite settings.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · PrivilegeList

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4726(S) A user account was deleted · checked 2026-10-14

4728

A member was added to a security-enabled global group

Security

Domain-only counterpart of 4732 for global groups. Microsoft documents it as identical to 4732 in fields and XML; only the group type differs.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Watch additions to privileged domain groups such as Domain Admins. Identify the actor through SubjectLogonId and check when the new member first used its new rights.

Caveats

Requires Audit Security Group Management. Recorded on domain controllers only; Microsoft has no separate page for this ID.

Fields

MemberName · MemberSid · TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · PrivilegeList

Source: Microsoft Learn — Audit Security Group Management · checked 2026-10-14

4732

A member was added to a security-enabled local group

Security

Generated each time a member is added to a security-enabled local group, such as the built-in Administrators group. Each added member produces a separate event.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Additions to local Administrators or Remote Desktop Users are common persistence steps. Use MemberSid rather than MemberName to identify the member.

Caveats

Requires Audit Security Group Management. For local groups MemberName is usually "-" even when a domain account is added.

Fields

MemberName · MemberSid · TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · PrivilegeList

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4732(S) A member was added to a security-enabled local group · checked 2026-10-14

4738

A user account was changed

Security

Generated each time a user object is changed. Changed attributes carry their new values; unchanged ones show "-".

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Compare OldUacValue and NewUacValue for flags such as "Don't Require Preauth" or "Password Not Required"; non-empty SidHistory or AllowedToDelegateTo changes deserve review.

Caveats

Requires Audit User Account Management. Some changes (for example DACL changes) appear with all attributes as "-", and some changes produce no 4738 at all.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · SamAccountName · UserPrincipalName · PasswordLastSet · AccountExpires · PrimaryGroupId · AllowedToDelegateTo · OldUacValue · NewUacValue · UserAccountControl · SidHistory · LogonHours

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4738(S) A user account was changed · checked 2026-10-14

4740

A user account was locked out

Security

Generated every time a user account is locked out after exceeding the lockout threshold. On domains it is recorded on the domain controller.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

The caller computer name shown in the event points to where the failed attempts came from; follow it to 4625/4771/4776 on that host or the domain controller.

Caveats

Requires Audit User Account Management. The caller is given as a computer name, not an IP address, even for computers outside the domain.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4740(S) A user account was locked out · checked 2026-10-14

4756

A member was added to a security-enabled universal group

Security

Domain-only counterpart of 4732 for universal groups (for example Enterprise Admins). Microsoft documents the same fields and XML as 4732.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Treat additions to forest-wide privileged groups as high priority; trace the actor through SubjectLogonId and check replication to other domain controllers.

Caveats

Requires Audit Security Group Management. Recorded on domain controllers only; Microsoft has no separate page for this ID.

Fields

MemberName · MemberSid · TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · PrivilegeList

Source: Microsoft Learn — Audit Security Group Management · checked 2026-10-14

Kerberos and NTLM authentication 4

4768

A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested

Security

Generated on domain controllers each time the Key Distribution Center issues, or fails to issue, a ticket-granting ticket. Status 0x0 means success.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

IpAddress gives the client that authenticated; this is often the best domain-wide record of where an account was used. Note PreAuthType 0 (no pre-authentication) and legacy encryption types such as RC4 (0x17) or DES.

Caveats

Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication Service on domain controllers. Pre-authentication failures (0x18) are logged as 4771, not 4768. Recent updates added fields, so field sets differ by build.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetSid · ServiceName · TicketOptions · Status · TicketEncryptionType · PreAuthType · IpAddress · IpPort · CertIssuerName · CertSerialNumber · CertThumbprint

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4768(S, F) A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested · checked 2026-10-14

4769

A Kerberos service ticket was requested

Security

Generated on domain controllers every time the KDC receives a request for a service ticket (TGS). Failures carry a non-zero Status.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Shows which services an account requested access to and from where. Many requests for different service accounts with RC4 encryption from one client can indicate ticket harvesting for offline password cracking.

Caveats

Requires Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations; the volume is high in most domains. Status 0x20 (ticket expired) is common and mostly informational.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · ServiceName · ServiceSid · TicketOptions · TicketEncryptionType · IpAddress · IpPort · Status · LogonGuid · TransmittedServices

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4769(S, F) A Kerberos service ticket was requested · checked 2026-10-14

4771

Kerberos pre-authentication failed

Security

Generated on domain controllers when the KDC fails to issue a TGT because pre-authentication failed. Status 0x18 usually means a wrong password.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Count failures per account and per IpAddress in short windows to identify password guessing or spraying. Compare with 4740 lockouts and later successful 4768 for the same account.

Caveats

Requires Audit Kerberos Authentication Service. Not generated for accounts set to "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication". Certificate fields are always empty in this event.

Fields

TargetUserName · TargetSid · ServiceName · TicketOptions · Status · PreAuthType · IpAddress · IpPort · CertIssuerName · CertSerialNumber · CertThumbprint

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4771(F) Kerberos pre-authentication failed · checked 2026-10-14

4776

The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account

Security

Generated on the computer authoritative for the credentials whenever NTLM credential validation succeeds or fails: the domain controller for domain accounts, the local computer for local accounts.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Workstation names the origin of the attempt, not the destination. Use Status codes (for example 0xC000006A bad password, 0xC0000064 unknown user) to classify failures, and look for NTLM use where Kerberos is expected.

Caveats

Requires Audit Credential Validation. It does not record which server the user was trying to reach, and it is not generated when a domain account logs on locally to a domain controller.

Fields

PackageName · TargetUserName · Workstation · Status

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4776(S, F) The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account · checked 2026-10-14

Process and object access 5

4656

A handle to an object was requested

Security

Records a request to open a handle to an audited object and whether it was granted. A failure event is generated when access is declined.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Failures show attempted access that was blocked. For successes, look for a matching 4663 with the same HandleId to show that the access was actually used.

Caveats

A requested handle does not prove that the operation happened. Requires a matching SACL entry and the relevant object-access subcategory.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · ObjectServer · ObjectType · ObjectName · HandleId · TransactionId · AccessList · AccessReason · AccessMask · PrivilegeList · RestrictedSidCount · ProcessId · ProcessName · ResourceAttributes

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4656(S, F) A handle to an object was requested · checked 2026-10-14

4657

A registry value was modified

Security

Generated when a registry value is created, modified or deleted under an audited key. Records the old and new value and type.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Shows the before and after state of autostart locations and security settings together with the process that changed them. Compare with registry hive analysis, where only the final state and key LastWrite time survive.

Caveats

Requires Audit Registry and "Set Value" auditing in the key's SACL. Not generated when only a key (not a value) changes. ObjectName uses \REGISTRY\MACHINE style paths.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · ObjectName · ObjectValueName · HandleId · OperationType · OldValueType · OldValue · NewValueType · NewValue · ProcessId · ProcessName

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4657(S) A registry value was modified · checked 2026-10-14

4663

An attempt was made to access an object

Security

Records that a specific access right was actually used on an audited object such as a file, registry key or kernel object.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Use ObjectName, AccessList and ProcessName to show which process wrote to, deleted or changed permissions on a file. Link to 4656 through HandleId.

Caveats

Generated only when the object's SACL contains a matching audit entry and the relevant subcategory (File System, Registry, Kernel Object or Removable Storage) is enabled. There is no failure variant.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · ObjectServer · ObjectType · ObjectName · HandleId · AccessList · AccessMask · ProcessId · ProcessName · ResourceAttributes

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4663(S) An attempt was made to access an object · checked 2026-10-14

4688

A new process has been created

Security

Generated every time a new process starts. Records the executable path, the creating process, the token elevation type and, if enabled by policy, the command line.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Build process trees with NewProcessId and ProcessId (the creator), and link them to sessions through SubjectLogonId. Compare with Prefetch, Amcache and 4689 to bound execution.

Caveats

Requires Audit Process Creation. CommandLine is empty unless "Include command line in process creation events" is enabled. Process IDs are reused, so always pair them with time.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · NewProcessId · NewProcessName · TokenElevationType · ProcessId · CommandLine · TargetUserSid · TargetUserName · TargetDomainName · TargetLogonId · ParentProcessName · MandatoryLabel

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4688(S) A new process has been created · checked 2026-10-14

4689

A process has exited

Security

Generated every time a process exits. Records the process name, its ID and the exit status.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Pair with 4688 on ProcessId and ProcessName to estimate how long a program ran.

Caveats

Requires Audit Process Termination. The meaning of the exit Status is defined by each application.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · Status · ProcessId · ProcessName

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4689(S) A process has exited · checked 2026-10-14

Audit policy and log integrity 3

104

The log file was cleared

System

Logged by Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog in the System log when an event log other than Security (for example System or Application) is cleared. The message names the cleared log.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Look for it alongside 1102 to see whether several logs were cleared together; the time bounds the start of the gap in each log.

Caveats

The cited page is archived Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation and lists the message only. Clearing the System log itself still leaves this event as the first entry of the new log.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Event ID 104 — Private Channel Configuration · checked 2026-10-14

1102

The audit log was cleared

Security

Generated every time the Windows Security log is cleared. Records the account that cleared it.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Treat it as the start of a known gap. Recover earlier events from forwarded copies (SIEM, Windows Event Forwarding), Volume Shadow Copies or unallocated space, and correlate SubjectLogonId with 4624.

Caveats

Logged by the Eventlog provider, not by an audit subcategory. Other methods of destroying logs (such as deleting the .evtx file offline) do not produce this event.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId

Source: Microsoft Learn — 1102(S) The audit log was cleared · checked 2026-10-14

4719

System audit policy was changed

Security

Generated when the computer's audit policy changes. Records the category, subcategory and whether success or failure auditing was added or removed.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

A removed audit setting explains gaps in later logs; establish when the change happened and whether it was planned (for example Group Policy refresh) or followed suspicious activity.

Caveats

Microsoft states the event is always logged regardless of the Audit Policy Change setting. It shows that the policy changed, not why; check Group Policy history before attributing the change to a person.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · CategoryId · SubcategoryId · SubcategoryGuid · AuditPolicyChanges

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4719(S) System audit policy was changed · checked 2026-10-14

System and services 10

41

The system has rebooted without cleanly shutting down first

System

Logged by Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Power at startup when the previous session ended without a clean shutdown, for example after a power loss, hang or stop error.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

A non-zero BugcheckCode points to a stop error; PowerButtonTimestamp may indicate the power button was held. Compare with 6008 and crash dumps before drawing conclusions about deliberate power-off.

Caveats

Records only that the shutdown was unclean; many causes (hardware, drivers, power) produce the same event.

Fields

BugcheckCode · BugcheckParameter1 · BugcheckParameter2 · BugcheckParameter3 · BugcheckParameter4 · SleepInProgress · PowerButtonTimestamp

Source: Microsoft Learn — Advanced troubleshooting for Event ID 41 · checked 2026-10-14

1074

A process initiated a restart or shutdown

System

Logged by the User32 source when an application or user initiates a shutdown or restart. The message names the process, the user on whose behalf it acted, the reason, the reason code and the shutdown type.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Identifies who or what requested a reboot (for example an update agent, shutdown.exe or a remote administrator). Place it before the matching 6006 and 6005.

Caveats

The cited page documents the message text, not structured field names. The reason text is chosen by the initiator and may be generic.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Troubleshoot unexpected reboots using system event logs · checked 2026-10-14

4697

A service was installed in the system

Security

Generated in the Security log when a new service is installed. Records the service name, binary path, type, start type and account.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Unlike 7045 it carries the installing account. Flag ServiceFileName outside Windows or Program Files folders and correlate with 7045 and the service's registry key.

Caveats

Requires Audit Security System Extension; minimum Windows 10 / Server 2016. Later changes to path or account are not logged by this event.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · ServiceName · ServiceFileName · ServiceType · ServiceStartType · ServiceAccount

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4697(S) A service was installed in the system · checked 2026-10-14

6005

The Event log service was started

System

Logged by the EventLog source when the Event Log service starts, which in practice marks system startup.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Use 6005 with 6006, 6008, 6009 and 1074 to list boot and shutdown cycles and to check whether the system was running during the period in question.

Caveats

Filter on both event ID and source, since the same IDs are used by other sources.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Troubleshoot unexpected reboots using system event logs · checked 2026-10-14

6006

The Event log service was stopped

System

Logged by the EventLog source when the Event Log service stops during an orderly shutdown; Microsoft describes it as indicating that Windows was adequately turned off.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Pair each 6006 with the following 6005 to measure downtime. A boot without a preceding 6006 points to an unclean shutdown (see 6008 and 41).

Caveats

Records the stop of the logging service, not who requested the shutdown; use 1074 for that.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Advanced troubleshooting for Event ID 41 · checked 2026-10-14

6008

The previous system shutdown was unexpected

System

Logged by the EventLog source at the next startup when the previous shutdown was not clean. The message contains the date and time of that shutdown.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

The time in the message estimates when the system went down; examine events just before it, and compare with Kernel-Power 41 and any crash dump.

Caveats

The time and date in the message are rendered as text in local time conventions; verify the time zone before placing it on a UTC timeline.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Troubleshoot unexpected reboots using system event logs · checked 2026-10-14

7034

A service terminated unexpectedly

System

Logged by the Service Control Manager when a service terminates unexpectedly and no recovery action is configured. The message gives the service name and how many times it has happened.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Repeated crashes of security or logging services near the time of an incident may indicate tampering; compare with 7036 state changes and process events.

Caveats

Cited from archived Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation. A crash is usually a software fault; the event alone does not show intent.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Event ID 7034 — Service Stop Operations · checked 2026-10-14

7036

A service entered a new state

System

Logged by the Service Control Manager when a service enters a new state, for example running or stopped.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Shows when services such as Windows Defender, Event Log or Remote Desktop were stopped or started; place these transitions on the timeline next to logons and process creation.

Caveats

Very frequent and does not record who requested the change. Cited from archived Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Event ID 7036 — Basic Service Operations · checked 2026-10-14

7040

The start type of a service was changed

System

Logged by the Service Control Manager when a service's start type changes, for example from automatic to disabled.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

A change to disabled for a security or logging service, or to automatic for an unknown service, is relevant to defence evasion and persistence questions.

Caveats

Windows components change start types routinely (for example during updates). Cited from archived Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Event ID 7040 — Basic Service Operations · checked 2026-10-14

7045

A new service was installed

System

Logged by the Service Control Manager when a service is installed. Microsoft Defender for Identity lists it as a required event ("New Service Installed").

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

A standard check for remote execution tools and persistence: review the service name and image path, then look for a 4624 (LogonType 3) and 4697 at the same time.

Caveats

The cited page lists the event but does not document its fields. Legitimate software installs services too; context decides.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Configure Windows event auditing (Microsoft Defender for Identity) · checked 2026-10-14

Scheduled tasks 6

106

Task registered

Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational

Logged by Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler when a user registers (creates) a task. The message names the task and the user.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Useful where Security auditing for 4698 was not enabled. Combine with 200/201 to show that the task actually ran.

Caveats

The Operational log may be disabled or small and roll over quickly. Cited from archived Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Event ID 106 — General Task Registration · checked 2026-10-14

200

Action started

Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational

Logged when Task Scheduler launches an action in an instance of a task. The message names the task, the action and the instance.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Gives execution times for a task; the action string identifies the program run. Pair with 201 by instance and with 4688 for the process.

Caveats

Cited from archived Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation; message only, no structured field list.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Event ID 200 — Task Monitoring and Control · checked 2026-10-14

201

Action completed

Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational

Logged when Task Scheduler successfully completes an action of a task instance.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

The interval between 200 and 201 for the same instance bounds how long the action ran.

Caveats

"Completed" refers to the task engine; it does not mean the program achieved its purpose. Cited from archived Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation.

Source: Microsoft Learn — Event ID 201 — Task Monitoring and Control · checked 2026-10-14

4698

A scheduled task was created

Security

Generated every time a new scheduled task is created. TaskContent contains the full task XML, including triggers, actions and the account it runs as.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Read the action command and trigger in TaskContent; tasks at the library root (\TaskName) deserve attention. Compare with the task file under System32\Tasks and with TaskScheduler events 106, 200 and 201.

Caveats

Requires Audit Other Object Access Events. Windows 10 1903 and later add client process fields (event version 1).

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · TaskName · TaskContent

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4698(S) A scheduled task was created · checked 2026-10-14

4699

A scheduled task was deleted

Security

Generated every time a scheduled task is deleted. TaskContent holds the XML definition of the deleted task.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Preserves the content of a task that no longer exists on disk; a create-run-delete sequence in a short window is typical of remote execution tools.

Caveats

Requires Audit Other Object Access Events.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · TaskName · TaskContent

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4699(S) A scheduled task was deleted · checked 2026-10-14

4702

A scheduled task was updated

Security

Generated every time a scheduled task is updated or changed. TaskContentNew holds the new XML definition.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Look for existing, legitimate-looking tasks whose action was replaced; compare TaskContentNew with the previous 4698 or a known-good copy.

Caveats

Requires Audit Other Object Access Events. The previous definition is not included in this event.

Fields

SubjectUserSid · SubjectUserName · SubjectDomainName · SubjectLogonId · TaskName · TaskContentNew

Source: Microsoft Learn — 4702(S) A scheduled task was updated · checked 2026-10-14

PowerShell 1

4104

Script block logging

Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational

When Script Block Logging is enabled, Windows PowerShell records the content of the script blocks it processes in this event.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Recovers the actual code run, including code that was decoded or generated at run time. Reassemble long scripts split across several events using the script block ID, and correlate with 4688 for the powershell.exe process.

Caveats

Must be enabled by Group Policy or registry. With Protected Event Logging the content is encrypted and needs the private key to read. PowerShell 7 writes to a separate PowerShellCore log.

Source: Microsoft Learn — about_Logging (Windows PowerShell 5.1) · checked 2026-10-14

Remote Desktop 3

21

Remote Desktop Services: Session logon succeeded

Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational

Logged by the Local Session Manager when a session logon succeeds. The message gives the user, session ID and source network address.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Confirms interactive or RDP sessions on the host even when Security logs are missing. Compare the source address with 4624 LogonType 10 and with 24/25 for the same session ID.

Caveats

The listed names are message labels from archived Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation, not XML field names. Console logons show a local source address.

Fields

User · Session ID · Source Network Address

Source: Microsoft Learn — Event ID 21 — Remote Desktop Services Availability · checked 2026-10-14

24

Remote Desktop Services: Session has been disconnected

Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational

Logged when a session is disconnected. The message gives the user, session ID and source network address.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Marks the end of an active connection while the session stays alive; pair with 25 to find reconnections from different addresses.

Caveats

Disconnection is not logoff. Cited from archived Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation; field names are message labels.

Fields

User · Session ID · Source Network Address

Source: Microsoft Learn — Event ID 24 — Remote Desktop Services Availability · checked 2026-10-14

25

Remote Desktop Services: Session reconnection succeeded

Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational

Logged when a user reconnects to an existing session. The message gives the user, session ID and source network address.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

A reconnection from a new address to an existing session can show a session being taken over from another location; compare with 4778.

Caveats

Cited from archived Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation; field names are message labels.

Fields

User · Session ID · Source Network Address

Source: Microsoft Learn — Event ID 25 — Remote Desktop Services Availability · checked 2026-10-14

Microsoft Defender Antivirus 2

1116

The antimalware platform detected malware or other potentially unwanted software

Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational

Microsoft Defender Antivirus detected malware or potentially unwanted software. Records the threat name, severity, path, detection source, user and process.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Path and Process Name locate the file and the process involved; compare the time with file system timestamps and process events. Check the following 1117 to see what action was taken.

Caveats

A detection names a signature match, not proof of execution or of who placed the file. Field names are the labels listed by Microsoft.

Fields

Name · ID · Severity · Category · Path · Detection Origin · Detection Type · Detection Source · User · Process Name · Signature Version · Engine Version

Source: Microsoft Learn — Microsoft Defender Antivirus event IDs and error codes · checked 2026-10-14

1117

The antimalware platform performed an action to protect your system

Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational

Microsoft Defender Antivirus took an action (such as quarantine or remove) on detected software. Records the action, its status and any error.

Fields, correlation and caveats

How to use it

Determine whether the threat was actually remediated: an Allow, No action or None action leaves it in place. Quarantined items may be recoverable for analysis.

Caveats

A successful action does not mean the threat had not already run. Field names are the labels listed by Microsoft.

Fields

Name · ID · Severity · Category · Path · Detection Origin · Detection Type · Detection Source · User · Process Name · Action · Action Status · Error Code · Error Description · Signature Version · Engine Version

Source: Microsoft Learn — Microsoft Defender Antivirus event IDs and error codes · checked 2026-10-14